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Abstract 
 
In a world where the private protection of property is costly, government redistribution 
can lead to an increase in aggregate output. This result is not new. The novelty of this 
paper lies in specifying the conditions under which this efficiency-enhancing 
redistribution improves everyone’s welfare including the welfare of those whose labor 
finances the redistributive program (i.e., the rich) and how this is affected by the 
protection of property rights. The state may directly enhance economic rights through 
investments in security and the protection of property or it may indirectly do so through 
the redistribution of income. Under certain conditions, redistribution becomes desirable 
in situations where the state has exhausted its ability to enhance efficiency through the 
direct enforcement of property rights. In this case, redistribution can make all members of 
a society better off. Specifically, this occurs when the cost of predation is sufficiently low 
and the technology of private protection of property rights is sufficiently weak. The 
adverse effects of redistribution may be the consequence but not the cause of state failure. 
The real cause is a corrupt and inept state. 
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1. Introduction 
The first welfare theorem states that, under certain conditions, any competitive 
allocation is Pareto efficient. The second welfare theorem states that any Pareto efficient 
allocation can be supported as a competitive equilibrium through lump-sum taxes and 
transfers. Instructors in Public and Welfare economics courses typically emphasize the 
trade-off between efficiency (increasing the size of the pie) and equity (distributing the 
pie). Indeed, the old Public Economics tradition evidenced in textbooks by Richard 
Musgrave emphasize that redistribution has an adverse effect on efficiency. But it is now 
known that when the first welfare theorem ceases to hold, as in the case of public good 
goods, there may be a case for redistribution which enhances efficiency. For example, 
government redistribution from altruistic rich people to the poor could make the rich 
better off, given that charity is a public good to the rich. Also, redistribution enhances 
efficiency in a world where agents are risk-averse and income is determined by luck. 
Government redistribution is then a form of social insurance.1 
 There is yet another scenario where the first welfare theorem fails such that 
redistribution could lead to an increase in the economy’s output. This is when property 
rights are incomplete. The degree of property rights protection plays a crucial role in the 
functioning of markets. When economic agents cannot enjoy the fruits of their labor, this 
has adverse effects on their incentives to invest, work, save, etc. Hence, one should not 
expect the first welfare theorem to hold when property rights are incomplete.2 When 
incomplete property rights result in the failure of the first welfare theorem, there may be 
                                                 
1 These arguments and others are nicely reviewed in Boadway and Keen (2000) and Chapter 3 of Mueller 
(2003). 
2 This point was forcefully made by Usher (1987) in his analysis of the efficiency effects of theft. However, 
he does not examine redistribution as a second-best solution to the problem. 
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room for efficiency-enhancing government redistribution. This result is not new. The 
novelty of the paper lies in specifying the conditions under which this efficiency-
enhancing redistribution improves everyone’s welfare including the welfare of those who 
labor finances the redistributive program (i.e., the rich) and how this is affected by the 
protection of property rights.  
I find that while redistribution increases aggregate output, it may make some 
members of the society worse off. The state may directly enhance economic rights 
through investments in security and the protection of property or it may indirectly do so 
through the redistribution of income. Under certain conditions, some moderate form of 
redistribution becomes desirable in situations where the state has exhausted its ability to 
enhance efficiency through the direct enforcement of property rights. In this case, 
redistribution can make all members of a society better off. This occurs when the cost of 
predation is sufficiently low and the technology of private protection of property rights is 
sufficiently weak. I argue that the adverse effects of redistribution may be the 
consequence but not the cause of state failure. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses how the present 
paper is related to previous literature. Section 3 presents a very simple model of 
incomplete property rights where agents can choose to be predators or producers. I show 
how redistribution can be Pareto-improving in this environment. Section 4 discusses the 
results of the paper. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Relationship to previous literature 
 Justino (2005) finds empirical support for the efficiency-enhancing effect of 
redistribution. Using data for fourteen major Indian states between 1973 and 2000, she 
found that redistributive policies have been significantly more effective in reducing civil 
unrest in India than more direct mechanisms like using the police or military. It also had 
positive effects on growth. 
Redistribution in my model could be seen as a form of bribery from the rich (i.e., 
high-ability agents) to the poor (low-ability agents) which enables the rich to “buy their 
peace” (Grossman, 1994, 1995). This is also similar to Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) 
where the rich elite accept redistributive taxation in order to prevent a revolution. Indeed, 
the effect of inequality on economic growth has led to a growing literature in economics. 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) show, in a model without privately-enforced predation, that 
income inequality has an adverse effect on growth. They argue that in more unequal 
societies, economic growth is lower because the demand for fiscal redistribution financed 
by distortionary taxation is higher. The inverse relationship between inequality and 
growth is tested empirically in Alesina and Perotti (1996). In that paper, they argue that 
income inequality fuels social discontent and increases socio-political instability. The 
uncertainty in the politico-economic environment reduces investment which reduces 
growth.3  
The model is similar to Palda (1999) but it differs from it in the following 
respects: First, I assume a continuous distribution of abilities while Palda (1999) assumes  
                                                 
3 See Kanbur (2000) for a survey of the inequality-growth debate. 
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a discrete distribution.4 Second, the welfare of a producer is decreasing in the total 
number of predators. In Palda (1999), a producer’s welfare is independent of the number 
of predators. Finally but more importantly, I obtain results (like my proposition 2) which 
are not obtained by Palda (1999). That is, Palda (1999) focuses on how redistribution 
might enhance efficiency but in cases where redistribution enhances efficiency, Palda 
(1999) does not consider if redistribution improves the welfare of the rich.  
Bos and Kolmar (2003) develop a theory of redistribution stemming from 
differences in individual productivity. To see this, consider a world with two people, A 
and B, in a state of anarchy. There is an initial allocation of land between A and B but A 
is more productive in the use of the land than B. Then it is in the interest of both parties 
for B to transfer part of his land to A in period 1, B produces some output in period 2, and 
redistributes an agreed-upon output to A in period 3. Of course, in a one-shot game, A 
has no incentive to honor the agreement to transfer some output to B. Therefore, to 
enforce this agreement, Bos and Kolmar (2003) analyze an infinitely-repeated version of 
this game yielding a folk-theorem type notion of co-operation.5 They define this self-
enforcing rule as a constitution and therefore the state emerges from a Hobbesian “state 
of nature”. In their model, redistribution of output is a compensating mechanism that 
enables the society to Pareto-improve the initial allocation of land. My model differs 
from Bos and Kolmar (2003) in the following respects: (1) I consider a one-shot game 
                                                 
4 Also, Palda (1999) does not analytically prove the effect of redistribution on efficiency, although he uses 
a specific functional form for the distribution of individual abilities. Palda (1999, p. 138) notes that “[E]ven 
though equation (24) appears to allow for some ambiguity as set-up, income distribution will always 
increase national income by enticing marginal takers to become makers… I have confirmed this in 
simulation of the above for a wide variety of parameter values.” 
5 Noh (2002) develops a model with two players. One player is a producer and the other player is a 
predator. The producer can make a transfer to the predator to deter the predator from attacking him. Noh 
(2002) assumes that the predator does not attack the prey after he has received the transfer. Unlike, Bos and 
Kolmar (2003), he considers a two-period game, so there is no reason why the predator cannot attack after 
receiving the transfer.  
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involving predators, producers, and a government, (2) in my model, an agent can be 
either a producer or predator but not both. Two other key differences are that Bos and 
Kolmar (2003) cannot determine the effect of the number of predators on the welfare of 
producers and there is no predation in equilibrium. However, as argued by Barzel (2000), 
predation cannot be entirely eliminated. However, my model is similar to Bos and 
Kolmar (2003) because redistribution arises as result of differences in productivities 
among agents. However, my results (e.g., proposition 2) differ from Bos and Kolmar 
(2003). 
Another model which is close to mine is Grossman (2002). Unlike my model, his 
model has no predation in equilibrium when the state intervenes.6 Also, Grossman (2002) 
considers a model with identical agents, so there is not a unique set of producers and 
predators. Since my model has different agents, I am able to identify a unique set of 
producers and predators. In my model and Grossman (2002), state intervention may be 
beneficial. But this is driven by different forces. In Grossman (2002) the state uses tax 
revenue collected from producers for investment in the protection of private property 
(i.e., output), which in turn increases output and therefore tax revenue. In my model, the 
state does not invest in the protection of private property. The state deters predation by 
distributing its tax revenue to predators. Grossman (2002) can be seen as a model in 
which the state’s role is to directly enhance economic rights, while the state indirectly 
does so in my model. Redistribution may be preferable when the benefits of the 
                                                 
6 As Barzel (2002) notes, it is impossible to eliminate predation or theft in a society. 
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enforcement of legal rights have been exhausted. By taxing the output of predators before 
predators are able to lay hands on it, the state makes predation less attractive. 7  
The paper is also related to the literature on rent seeking as appropriative activity 
(e.g., Skaperdas, 1992; Allen, 2002; Konrad, 2002; Gradstein, 2007). For example, 
Gradstein (2007) considers a model where a ruling rich elite is contemplating mass 
political participation (i.e., democracy). In his model, democratization and the attendant 
protection of property rights by the state reduces rent seeking, and boosts investment and 
growth. 8 This beneficial effect of democratization must be balanced against the cost to 
the rich, since democratization will result in a shift of policy from the preferred policy of 
the rich. This cost is higher, the higher is the degree of inequality between the rich and 
the poor. Hence, democratization and state protection of property rights will occur, if and 
only if the inequality between the rich and poor is sufficiently small. In other words, the 
rich elite will agree to democratize (i.e., redistribute income to the poor), if the costs 
(benefits) are sufficiently small (large).9 This is similar to the thrust of the argument 
behind my main result in the sense that the rich will agree to redistribute income to the 
poor, if their ability to protect their own property is sufficiently weak in which case the 
benefits of redistribution to the rich are sufficiently high.  
  
 
 
                                                 
7 Grossman (1995) also considers a model with government tax-financed income redistribution. Like Bos 
and Kolmar (2003), there is no predation in equilibrium.  
Grossman (1994) considers a similar model but redistribution occurs through a reform of property (i.e., 
land) ownership. 
8 Unlike my model, rent-seeking is productive in his model. In particular, productive investment and rent-
seeking investment are complements in an agent’s net capital endowment. Therefore, the return to rent-
seeking investment is higher for agents with higher investments in productive capital. 
9 See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). 
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3.  A model of redistribution and incomplete property rights 
Consider an economy in which risk-neutral agents of unit measure can choose to 
be producers or predators (i.e., steal from producers). Agents have an ability or 
productivity parameter, r, distributed continuously on ]r,r[  with density f(r) > 0, 
distribution function F(r), and 0r ≥ . An agent with productivity, r, can produce an output 
equal to r. 
 Let n be the measure (number) of predators. The predation technology is such that 
a proportion, αn, of each producer’s output is stolen by predators, where 0 < αn < 1. 
Notice that this proportion is increasing in the total measure, n, of predators. So if Y is 
total output by producers, then αnY is stolen by predators. Let c > 0 be the cost of 
predation. This cost includes the cost of weapons, expected penalty for breaking the law, 
the guilt of wrong doing, etc. If α = 0, then property rights are complete. In this paper, we 
consider incomplete property rights (i.e., α > 0). I assume that 0 < α ≤ 1.  
 The total output stolen is shared equally among all predators. So the payoff to a 
predator is αnY/n – c and the payoff to a producer is (1 –  αn)r. A person with ability, r, 
will be a predator if 
r)n1(c
n
nY α−≥−α          (1) 
Let rˆ  be the ability of the marginal predator who is indifferent between predation or 
production. In this case, the expression in (1) holds with equality. Solving (1) gives 
( )cY
)n1(
1rˆ −αα−=          (2) 
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It is easy to show that an agent with ability r ≤ rˆ  will be a predator and an agent with 
ability r > rˆ  will be a producer. Hence sufficiently high-ability agents are producers and 
sufficiently low-ability agents are predators. 
 The process of finding an equilibrium works as follows: Suppose all agents before 
they decide on their profession form expectations about the measure of predators, n. If we 
find a value of n such that the expected n is equal to the actual n, then we have an 
equilibrium. Technically, an equilibrium involves finding a fixed point. 
 Given that agents with r > rˆ  are producers and r ≤ rˆ  are predators, it follows that 
)rˆ(F
rˆ
r
dr)r(fn == ∫  and aggregate output is ∫= r
rˆ
dr)r(rfY . 
Putting these expressions into equation (2) gives 
)rˆ(gc
r
rˆ
dr)r(rf
)rˆ(F1
1rˆ ≡⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−αα−= ∫        (3) 
 For simplicity, suppose r is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], so that 1r,0r == and 
f(r) = 1. Then we have rˆ)rˆ(Fn ==  and )rˆ1(5.0rdrY 2
1
rˆ
−== ∫ . Then the solution (i.e., a 
fixed point)10 to equation (3) is 
1/c2)/1()/1(rˆ 2 −α+α±α=        (4) 
Given 0 < α ≤ 1 and noting that we require rˆ < 1, the only relevant root is  
 
                                                 
10 At least one fixed point exists because g( rˆ ) is continuous and rˆ belongs to the compact and convex set 
]r,r[ . 
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)0(rˆ1/c2)/1()/1(rˆ 2 ≡−α+α−α=        (4a)11 
The equilibrium measure of predators is unique. It is easy to show that for rˆ > 0, we 
require c < 0.5α c≡ .12 If c ≥ c , then there will be no predators in equilibrium and 
therefore we are in a first-best world where the first welfare theorem holds. 
Redistribution cannot be Pareto-improving. 
Given (4a), we obtain 
1/c2)/1(
1
c
rˆ
2 −α+αα
−=∂
∂ < 0       (5) 
This gives the following lemma: 
Lemma 1: An increase in the cost of predation results in a fall in the number of 
predators and therefore increases aggregate output. 
 
 For use in subsequent discussions, we note that  
0
)c21(
c
c
rˆ
5.12 <α−α+
α−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
α∂
∂ ,       (5a) 
given c < 0.5α. 
 
3.1 Redistribution and efficiency 
 Now I want to examine the effect of government redistribution on the incentive to 
be a producer or predator. In particular, the government implements a linear tax-transfer 
                                                 
11 Even if α > 1, the expression in (4a) is the only relevant root since the other root gives  
(1 –  αn) = (1 –  α rˆ ) < 0. 
12 The equilibrium is stable. To see this, note that given the uniform distribution on [0,1], 
g( rˆ ) = 0.5α – c if rˆ = 0. Since 0.5α – c > 0, it follows that g( rˆ ) must intersect the 45-degree line from 
above at the unique value rˆ (0) > 0. Therefore, the equilibrium is stable. In general, if there are equilibria 
with a positive measure of predators, then, at least, one of these equilibria is stable since g( rˆ ) > 0 at rˆ = r . 
For stability in this class of models, see, for example, note 14 and figure 2 in Alesina and Angeletos (2005). 
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scheme of the type pioneered by Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981). To do 
so, I consider the following sequence of actions: 
(a) The government announces a flat tax rate, t, on the output of each producer, 
where     0 < t < 1.  
(b) The government also announces that it will redistribute aggregate tax revenue 
equally among all agents, regardless of their choice of career.  
(c) Based on the government’s transfer/tax policy, agents decide whether to be 
producers or predators. 
(d) The government collects tax revenue and implements its transfer policy as 
announced in (a) and (b).13 
Notice that although the tax revenue is shared equally among all agents, it is still a 
net transfer to predators since predators produce no output.14 Notice also that producers 
with a lower ability benefit at the expense of producers with a higher ability. 
Alternatively, one may assume that redistribution takes the form of an in-kind transfer 
where the government uses the tax revenue to provide a public good that benefits 
everyone. 
A key assumption is that the government collects taxes from producers before 
predators get the chance to steal the output of producers. Since we are interested in how 
redistribution affects the incentives of predators, this timing of actions makes sense. This 
timing could also reflect the fact that the state has more power than individual predators. 
                                                 
13 This is still a linear tax-transfer scheme in the tradition of Meltzer and Richard (1981) given that  
predators in our model have a legal income of zero. In other words, the government announces a flat tax 
rate on everyone but is unable to collect taxes in the illegal sector of the economy. 
14 One might assume that the government redistributes the tax revenue to only predators. However, this is 
not likely to make sense since the government would not like to give the impression that it deals 
exclusively with bad people (predators). In view of this, the assumption that the government shares the tax 
revenue equally among all agents is much more plausible.  
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Until the state gets its share of output through taxes, individual predators have no power. 
In this case, the state has a first-mover advantage. For example, the state has this first-
mover advantage when it deducts income taxes directly and automatically from a 
person’s payroll. Hence, predators can only steal from a person’s disposable income not 
his gross income.15  
Let R(t) be the transfer per person. An agent of ability, r, will be a predator if 
)t(Rr)t1)(n1()t(Rc
n
Y)t1(n +−α−≥+−−α       (6) 
where ∫=
1
)t(rˆ
dr)r(rft)t(R  and )t(rˆ is the ability of the marginal predator.16 
The expression in (6) simplifies to  
r)n1(
t1
cY α−≥−−α         (7) 
 Comparing the expressions in (1) and (7), it is easy to see that redistribution is 
analytically equivalent to an increase in the cost of predation from c to c/(1-t). Therefore, 
using lemma 1, it follows that the ability of the marginal predator, rˆ , falls resulting in an 
increase in the measure of producers and aggregate output. Although redistribution does 
not appear to directly affect incentives because the term R cancels out in (6), it 
nevertheless affects incentives indirectly because taxation, in this model, is necessitated 
only by the desire to redistribute income. 
 
 
                                                 
15 It can be shown that if property rights are incomplete, government redistribution from producers to 
predators will reduce aggregate output, if predators steal output from producers before government collects 
taxes and redistributes income. The formal proof is available on request.  
16 Note that since the total measure of all agents is 1, aggregate transfer is the same as per capita transfer. 
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I summarize the above analysis in the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: If property rights are incomplete and the government collects taxes before 
predators steal output, then redistribution from producers to predators enhances 
efficiency (i.e., increases aggregate output).17 
 
3.2 The effect of redistribution on the welfare of producers 
While I have shown that redistribution increases aggregate output, I have not 
shown that it makes pre-redistribution producers better off, given that they are now 
subject to both predation and taxation.  
Note that with redistribution, the marginal predator has ability, 
1)t1/(c2)/1()/1()t(rˆ 2 −α−+α−α= . When there is no redistribution, the marginal 
predator has ability, )0(rˆ , given by equation (4a). Note that that t/)t(rˆ ∂∂ < 0. Therefore, 
rˆ (0) > rˆ (t) for t )1,0(∈ . Therefore, given proposition 1 and the separating nature of the 
equilibrium where any producer has a strictly higher ability than any predator, all agents 
with ability r > )0(rˆ > rˆ (t) will continue to be producers in the presence of government 
redistribution. That is, all pre-redistribution producers will continue to be producers after 
redistribution. But will they be better off? When there is no government redistribution,  
t = 0. I want to show that, under certain conditions, any producer with ability r > )0(rˆ > 0 
is better off for some t > 0.  
For any tax rate, t, the payoff to a producer with ability r > )0(rˆ  is 
U(r, t, α) = )t(Rr)t1)()t(rˆ1( +−α− ,       (8) 
                                                 
17 Notice that proposition 1 will not hold if property rights were complete (i.e., α = 0), because regardless of 
redistribution all agents will be producers, if t < 1. 
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where ]))t(rˆ(1[t5.0dr)r(rft)t(R 2
1
)t(rˆ
−== ∫ , 1/c2)/1()/1()t(rˆ 2 −α′+α−α=  and 
)t1/(cc −≡′ .  
Taking the derivative of equation (8) with respect to t gives 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
∂
∂−−+⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
∂
∂−−α−−=∂
∂
t
)t(rˆ)t(rˆt2))t(rˆ(15.0
t
)t(rˆ)t1())t(rˆ1(r
t
U 2    (9) 
The sign of the derivative in (9) is not easy to determine analytically. To simplify 
the analysis, I investigate the sign of this derivative as α→ 1. To do this, note the 
following preliminary results: 
t1
c21)t(rˆlim 1 −−=→α   and )t1(2
c
t1
1
t
)t(rˆlim 1 −−−=∂
∂
→α  
Putting these expressions into (9), we can show after some lengthy but straightforward 
algebra, that 
21 )t1(
)rttr2(c
t
Ulim −θ
θ−+−−=∂
∂≡∆ →α        (10) 
where 
t1
c2
−≡θ . Given r∈( )0(rˆ ,1] and t ∈(0,1), it follows that 2 – r – t > 0. Also, θ = 0 
if c = 0. Therefore, if c = 0, then 2 – r – t + rt – θ > 0. Also, if c = 0.5(1-t)(2 – r – t + rt)2 
≡ c~  > 0, then  2 – r – t + rt – θ = 0. Notice that (2 – r – t + rt – θ) is monotonically 
decreasing in c. It follows that ∆ > 0 if c∈(0, c~ ). 
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 Given α → 1, we require c < 0.5(1-t) ≡ cˆ  to obtain )t(rˆ > 0. Since cˆ < c~ for some 
r ∈( )0(rˆ ,1], it follows that the feasible set of values of c for which there is predation in 
equilibrium and ∆ > 0 for all agents with ability r > )0(rˆ is c∈(0, cˆ ).18 
The intuition behind the result in the preceding paragraph is straightforward. If  
α → 1, then a producer can protect a very low proportion of his property. Therefore, the 
benefits of redistribution in terms of reducing the number of predators (i.e., lowering n) is 
very high if α is very high. But for this benefit to be that high, it must be the case that the 
producers must be protected from predators who incur sufficiently low costs in their 
activity (i.e., c < cˆ ). Otherwise, if the costs of predation were sufficiently high such that 
predation is sufficiently low, then the benefits of redistribution will not be high enough to 
justify the cost (i.e., taxation) on high-ability producers, even if they had a very low 
ability to protect their property. This makes them worse off. Therefore, it the combination 
of a low ability to protect one’s property and low costs of predation which ensures that 
the rich are better off with redistribution. 
Noting that α captures the extent to which a producer or the state can protect 
property rights, where a lower α corresponds to a higher level of protection, gives the 
following proposition: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18If c ≥ cˆ , there is no predation (i.e., )t(rˆ = 0). The state sets t > 0 high enough to eliminate predation. I 
ignore this case because it is not particularly interesting. 
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Proposition 2: If all agents who were producers in the absence of redistribution have a 
sufficiently low ability to protect their property and if the individual cost of predation is 
sufficiently low, then all pre-redistribution producers will be better off with 
redistribution.19 
 Of course, I do not allow producers or the state to reduce α by investing resources 
in the protection of property rights. The implicit assumption is that there is some 
threshold level of α, say α  > 0, below which the protection of property is impossible. 
Belowα , the cost of protecting private property is prohibitive or there are sharp 
diminishing returns to investment in the protection of private property.  Proposition 2 
then implies that redistribution enhances the welfare of pre-redistribution producers, if α  
is sufficiently high and the cost of individual predation is sufficiently low (i.e., c < cˆ ).  
To elaborate further, recall that in this model, redistribution enhances efficiency 
by increasing the cost of predation from c to c/(1-t). Noting that the derivative in (5) is 
negative, the sign of the derivative in equation (5a) implies that benefits of redistribution 
are higher, the higher is α. Therefore, redistribution reduces the measure of predators by a 
bigger amount the weaker is the protection of property rights. Weaker property rights 
protection increases the measure of predators (i.e., α∂∂ /rˆ > 0). With a higher measure of 
predators, it is easier to reduce this measure by a bigger amount via redistribution. 
However, this higher marginal benefit must be balanced against the cost of redistribution 
                                                 
19Grossman (2002) obtains a somewhat similar result in a model with identical agents. But as noted earlier, 
there is no predation in equilibrium in his model when the government intervenes. In contrast, the result in 
this paper holds even if the state cannot fully deter predation or if doing so is prohibitively costly. Finally, 
as noted in section 2, Grossman (2002) obtains his result through the direct enforcement of property rights 
while I do so indirectly through redistribution.  
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to the rich, since they have to finance it by paying taxes. This is what drives the result in 
proposition 2.20  
Notice that ∂∆/∂r < 0.  Therefore, even if redistribution improves the welfare of 
producers, lower-ability producers benefit more than higher-ability producers. This is 
because higher-ability producers pay more in taxes than lower-ability producers. So the 
benefits of redistribution to higher-ability producers is smaller than for lower-ability 
producers.21 Hence if higher-ability producers are better off with redistribution, then 
lower-ability producers are also necessarily better off. 
 Predators who did not switch careers are also better off with redistribution. These 
are the predators with ability r < )t(rˆ . To see this, note that the payoff for a predator may 
be written as  
V(t) = α(1-t)Y(t) – c + R(t) = Y(t)[α(1-t) + t] – c.      (11) 
Since Y(t) is increasing in t (i.e., proposition 1) and α ≤ 1, it follows that V(t) is 
increasing in t.22  
The predators who became producers (i.e., those who switched careers) after 
redistribution have ability r )]0(rˆ),t(rˆ[∈ . It is easy to see that this group is also better off. 
Before redistribution they were predators and obtained the same payoff (i.e.,  
                                                 
20It is tempting to argue that proposition 2 implies that we should observe more redistribution in countries 
with weaker protection of property rights. But this will be stretching the results of this paper because the 
model does not endogenize the choice of property rights protection.  Also, weak property rights protection 
may be the consequence of a corrupt state, which will not engage in Pareto-improving redistribution as 
considered in this paper. 
21 This difference is not present in Grossman (2002) since all agents in his model are identical. 
22 The result that predators are better off regardless of the value of α is not a general result. From the 
standpoint of predators, redistribution is beneficial if the government is more efficient at legal/public-sector 
predation (i.e., taxation) relative to illegal/private-sector predation. Hence, the size of α will, in general, 
matter. For our purposes, it is sufficient that we can construct a model in which predators and producers are 
both better off with redistribution. 
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V(0) = αY(0) – c) as the predators who did not switch careers (i.e., those with ability r < 
)t(rˆ ). As shown above, V(t) > V(0) for t > 0. Since each agent is atomistic, any producer 
can switch to predation without affecting the redistribution equilibrium and thereby 
obtain a payoff of V(t).  So given that agents of ability r )]0(rˆ),t(rˆ[∈  choose to be 
producers, it follows that their payoff is higher than V(t). And since t > 0 gives V(t) > 
V(0), it follows that this group of agents is also better off with redistribution. 
Hence, if the conditions in proposition 2 hold then everyone is better off with 
redistribution. Given that redistribution leads to an increase in aggregate output, it is easy 
to appreciate why, under certain conditions, everyone can be made better off. 
To analytically determine the sign of the derivative in (9), when producers have a 
sufficiently high ability to protect their property rights, one could take the limit of this 
derivative as α → 0. Unfortunately, this is not possible since )t(rˆlim 0→α  does not exist.  
However, it is easy to see that if α = 0, the inequality in (1) will not hold. Hence, there  
will be no predators. Then given α = 0, redistribution makes a producer of ability r worse 
off if r > r)t1(dr)r(rft
r
r
−+∫ r~r >⇒ , where r~ is the expected or mean ability. Hence, 
anyone with above-average ability is worse off with redistribution.23 Based on this result, 
I conjecture that when α is sufficiently small, this effect will continue to dominate such 
that redistribution will make some high-ability producers worse off. By choosing a range 
of numerical values of c, r, α, and plotting U(t) against t ∈[0, 1), I am able to find 
examples where U(t) is monotonically decreasing in t, if α is sufficiently low. For 
example, for c = 0.00001, I find that ∂U/∂t < 0 for r = 0.8 > )0(rˆ , if α ≤ 0.78. I do not wish 
                                                 
23 This is a very well-known result given that property rights are complete. See, for example, Harms and 
Zink (2003). 
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to claim too much for this result given that it was based on numerical stimulations.24 But 
suffice it to say that redistribution could make some producers worse off if their ability to 
protect their property rights is sufficiently high. 
 
4. Discussion 
 A key concept in the analysis is the protection of property rights. To be sure, a 
distinction ought to be made between legal (property) rights and economic (property) 
rights. Barzel (2002, p. 15) defines economic rights as “an individual’s ability, in 
expected terms, to directly consume the services of an asset, or consume indirectly 
through exchange”. According to Barzel (2002, p.157) legal rights “… are the claims 
over assets delineated by the state as the property of particular individuals or 
institutions.” A person could have complete legal rights over his property (e.g., a piece of 
land) in the sense that the state recognizes that it is his. But he may not have full 
economic rights over that land. In other words, the person or the state cannot fully 
monitor or deter those who encroach on his land and thereby reap some economic gains 
from it. As Barzel (2002, p. 16) observes “economic rights can exist in the absence of 
legal rights”. Therefore, economic rights can exist in a Hobbesian “state of nature” and 
are akin to Hobbes’ “natural rights”. Of course, as Barzel (2002) correctly argues legal 
rights enhance economic rights. However, there are limits to the ability of the state in 
enforcing legal property rights. Barzel (2002, p. 158) makes this point poignantly when 
he notes that: 
 
                                                 
24 Of course, proposition 2 was not proven under general conditions. It was based on a specific distribution 
of abilities, although having stated the intuition, one could appreciate why this proposition would hold in a 
more general model. 
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“For an asset that needs protection, then, there is ambiguity about its economic owner. 
Assets that are not perfectly delineated lie, in part, in the public domain. By providing 
protection and legal delineation for an asset, a protection specialist reduces the portion 
that lies in the public domain and enhances the economic ownership over it. Even when 
protection is provided, however, ownership will not be made perfect, because airtight 
protection would be prohibitively costly. The assets protected by the specialist, then, will 
not be entirely immune to theft.” 
 
 The preceding discussion makes the point that institutionalizing property rights 
is expensive and legal rights are incomplete if they cannot be fully enforced. If we had 
full legal and economic property rights (i.e., α = 0), redistribution would not be necessary 
to enhance efficiency in a model like ours. In a world of incomplete economic property 
rights, redistribution may reduce the rate at which predators (e.g., the have-nots) encroach 
on the economic property rights of the rich. The enforcement of legal rights will typically 
be incomplete insofar as this enforcement is costly. Herein lies the logic behind the 
potential beneficial effects of redistribution in proposition 2.25 
Institutions emerge to minimize transactions costs which are the resources used to 
establish and maintain property (i.e., economic) rights (Coase, 1937; Demsetz, 1967; 
North, 1990). 26 Proposition 2 is insightful in light of the preceding discussions because it 
shows that in a world where the private protection of property is costly, redistribution 
through the tax system may emerge as an institution to enhance the welfare of high-
ability agents (i.e., producers). By taxing the output of producers, the state makes the 
remaining output less attractive to predators. But even so, private agents could also have 
                                                 
25 Barzel (2002) does not argue that the limits to property rights protection might make redistribution 
desirable. 
26 Gradstein (2004) explores a bi-directional causality between property rights and economic performance. 
In his model, better enforcement property rights leads to higher economic growth and higher growth 
enhances the enforcement of property rights. This two-way causation results in two steady equilibria: one 
with full protection of property rights and a high income level, and another with minimal protection of 
property rights and a low income level. 
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achieved the same goal by destroying part of their own output or by producing below r 
(i.e., below their output in the presence of full property rights) and thereby make their 
property less attractive to predators.27 However, a disadvantage of this behavior by 
private agents relative to state intervention is that it leads to deadweight losses, since 
output is destroyed or sub-optimally provided from a social point of view. Of course, this 
is based on the assumption that redistribution by the state results in a smaller deadweight 
loss. Indeed, in our model, it leads to zero deadweight losses (i.e., proposition 1).28 So 
ultimately the desirability of redistribution by the state depends on the relative efficiency 
of private agents in protecting their property. This brings us back to the message behind 
proposition 2. 
One may argue that a disadvantage of redistribution is that it is prone to wasteful 
rent-seeking activities and therefore it is better for the state to focus its energies on the 
protection and enforcement of property rights. But if we can trust the state to honestly 
and impartially protect property rights (via taxation), why can't we trust the same state to 
redistribute income without significant rent-seeking? One cannot have it both ways. If the 
protection of property rights (i.e., the courts, police etc) is not subject to too much rent-
seeking, then there should be no reason why redistribution will. A state that cannot 
redistribute income without too much rent-seeking can also not enforce the protection of 
property rights without too much rent seeking stemming from inefficient and corrupt 
courts, judges, police, etc.  
                                                 
27 Allen (2002) explores this behavior and gives several interesting examples. 
28 But this is just an artifact of the model stemming from the fact that producers inelastically supply labor. 
In a model with endogenous labor supply or leisure, government redistribution will typically lead to 
deadweight losses. 
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The preceding argument suggests that the adverse effect of redistribution through 
the political process is the consequence but not the cause of state failure. The real cause is 
a corrupt and inept state. An inept and corrupt state will grossly misuse tax revenue 
whether it purportedly claims to use it for redistribution or for the protection of property 
rights. One may argue that a corrupt state does more harm when it is in the business of 
redistribution than when it is in the business of protecting property rights. There seems to 
be no basis for this argument. Also, one could argue that selective or discriminatory 
protection of property rights by a corrupt state has redistributive effects.  The real 
challenge is to find ways of making the state to deliver in a manner which complements 
the efforts of private individuals.29 
  The most compelling argument against redistribution relative to property rights 
protection is that redistribution, even by an honest state, could have an adverse effect on 
efficiency since it distorts incentives, causes the recipients of transfers to be lazy, and 
distorts the effort decisions of high-ability people. In these cases where there is a tradeoff 
between equity and efficiency, one ought to be very careful. To be sure, this trade off 
cannot be eliminated.30 However, in situations where some moderate amount of 
redistribution can enhance efficiency and has the support of those whose labor finances 
the redistributive program, the case against redistribution is much weaker.31 It makes 
sense for a society to initially develop via the protection of property rights and well 
functioning markets. However, the market might produce extreme inequality and as 
Barzel (2000) points out there are limits to the ability of the state to protect property 
                                                 
29 This subject is beyond the scope of this paper. 
30 See Boadway and Keen (2000). 
31 As mentioned earlier, Justino (2005) presents empirical support for the efficiency-enhancing effect of 
redistribution. 
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rights. It then becomes necessary for the state to engage in some moderate redistribution 
in order to reduce inequality and more importantly enhance efficiency and the welfare of 
both the rich and poor.  
  Indeed, it can be argued that the existence of patriotic individuals committed to 
the public good, and the collective will of a people are necessary for development. Here 
again some redistribution can play a role. It is difficult to imagine a significant proportion 
of people in a society having a strong commitment to the public good when there are 
extreme socio-economic inequalities. Again, moderate redistribution and the consequent 
sense of belonging that an individual feels are important for producing individuals who 
are patriotic and committed to the public good.   
 On the preceding point, Alesina and Angeletos (2005) argue that political support 
for redistribution may stem from differences in social perceptions regarding the fairness 
of market outcomes, and the underlying sources of income inequality. Societies that 
believe that success is largely driven by one’s effort are less likely to support 
redistribution while those who believe that luck, corruption, and connections account for 
success are more likely to support redistribution. In the latter group, the cost of predation 
is likely to be small given that part of this cost is due to guilt or the moral cost of wrong 
doing. In such societies people can deconstruct their guilt or justify predation on the 
grounds that they are doing the right thing by stealing from the rich in order to reduce 
economic inequality which was generated by corruption, luck, or connections.  In order to 
deter predation, the low cost of predation (i.e., c < cˆ ) could result in a situation where 
societies which believe that success is due to luck may engage in more redistribution as 
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in Alesina and Angeletos (2005).32 And this form of redistribution may well be Pareto-
improving. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Using a very simple model, I show that redistribution can enhance efficiency in a 
world of incomplete property rights. The analysis shows that the assumption of complete 
property rights is crucial to the first welfare theorem and it also implies that, all other 
things being equal, redistribution cannot enhance efficiency in such a world.  
The analysis also shows that while redistribution increases aggregate output, it 
may make some members of the society worse off. If the agents who bear the brunt of 
redistributive programs are unable to sufficiently protect their property, then they will be 
better off and are willing to allow the state to tax them and transfer the proceeds to 
predators. But it is not only a weak ability to protect one’s property that matters. What is 
also required is a sufficiently low cost of predation. These two factors make redistribution 
desirable. 
Pareto-improving redistribution is very much desirable because it has the support 
of those whose labor finances the redistributive program. A politically-astute 
redistributive program must be designed to win the support of these people. Otherwise, 
the state must bear in mind that it ought to tread cautiously.  
 
                                                 
32However, redistribution in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) is not undertaken to deter predation. In their 
model, property rights are complete. Notice that in Alesina and Angeletos (2005), societies which care 
about fairness demand a positive level of redistribution in order to correct the perverse effect of luck on 
income inequality. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) assume that this demand for fairness is expressed through 
voting. My argument is that in certain societies this demand may be expressed through the threat of 
predation, revolution, or social unrest as in Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). 
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